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F
oreign direct investment (FDI), as pointed out by Kindleberger (1969),
arises when the host country has an investment opportunity that it can-
not exploit by itself because it lacks the means or technical know-how,
or because of market incompleteness (that is, access to capital markets is re-
stricted). A multinational corporation (MNC) may be able to exploit such
an opportunity because it has the necessary capital, technology, and manage-
rial skills to do so. Even though the return to foreign direct investment is
potentially large in many developing countries (for example, the opening up
of Eastern Europe provided advantages to multinational ﬁrms because of the
low cost of labor, low levels of capital in place, and the proximity to major
markets), the ﬂow of direct investment is concentrated in just a few coun-
tries.1 Lucas (1990) attributes this lack of FDI in countries with potentially
large marginal returns to capital to the fact that many developing countries
face higher political risk than industrialized ones.
A distinctive characteristic of FDI is that once an investment has been
made, a foreign investor cannot prevent the government in the host country
from changing the environment in which the investment decision was made.
Despite attempts to establish international tribunals, contracts between multi-
national corporations (MNCs) and sovereign countries are almost impossible
to enforce. The quality of institutions, and in particular, the degree of protec-
tion of property rights, are key in determining the expected return to foreign
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investors. Countries with relatively poor legal protection of assets, and a
high degree of political instability, generally exhibit high rates of expropria-
tion and this makes investment less attractive. In practice, expropriation can
take different forms. A direct act of expropriation involves nationalization of
foreign-owned corporations, in which the government simply takes control
of the capital stock (Kobrin 1980, 1984). There are also indirect forms of
expropriation that multinational corporations face. Examples include exces-
sive taxation, capital controls, manipulation of exchange rates, and bribes and
permits demanded by government ofﬁcials.
Inthisarticle,wedescribesomestylizedfactsaboutexpropriationepisodes
and other lessons learned from the empirical literature on FDI. We then sum-
marize some of the main theories attempting to explain the effects of expro-
priation on investment and growth. Finally, we develop a theory that relates
each type of expropriation to political instability and concentration of power.
Asimpletwo-periodpoliticaleconomymodelispresentedinwhichgroups
with access to an expropriation technology alternate in power according to
an exogenous probability. The group that controls the government in the
ﬁrst period has the ability to obtain bribes from foreign investors who are
attempting to gain access to production in the host country. This form of
indirect expropriation is analogous to an investment tax, in the sense that it
distorts the optimal allocation of international capital by imposing additional
costs to potential investors. After investment decisions have been made (in
the second period), the group in ofﬁce decides how much capital should be
seized or nationalized, a direct form of expropriation.
Following the literature on FDI, we will assume that any capital expropri-
ated by the host country becomes unproductive. This stylized representation
tries to characterize the empirical observation that MNCs are usually more
efﬁcient in running production than the host country. For example, Minor
(1994) documents that about 35 percent of all enterprises that were expropri-
ated between 1960 and 1979 have been privatized between 1980 and 1992,
indicatingpublic“disillusionwiththetypicalresultofexpropriation,thestate-
owned enterprise” (see Biais and Perotti 2002 for more on recent trends on
privatizations). Theoretically, the costs associated with expropriation arise
mainly because of two reasons. First, there is usually a reduction in the tech-
nological spillovers embodied in foreign capital. Second, because the capital
installed by foreign investors may be speciﬁc to the manager’s skills, it may
taketimefordomesticworkerstoacquiretheknow-howneededtooperatethe
foreigntechnology. Asaconsequence,reductionsinthecapitalstockinstalled
by MNCs imply productivity losses and depressed domestic wages.
At any point in time, the beneﬁt associated with expropriation is given by
the amount of goods that can be transferred from MNCs to domestic agents.
The tradeoff faced by policymakers is, therefore, given by the redistributive
gains of expropriation versus the income loss suffered by local workers.M. Azzimonti and P. D. Sarte: Barriers to FDI 289
Akeyassumptionisthattherearenoinstitutionalbarrierstodiscretionary
redistribution, so any group can appropriate all expropriated resources. Be-
cause the group in power is not forced to transfer resources to other groups, a
“tragedy of the commons” arises: there is too much expropriation in equilib-
rium. A tragedy of commons occurs when property rights of an asset cannot
be enforced; a typical example is ﬁshing on a lake. Typically this gives rise to
over-consumption or under-investment (see Gordon 1954 or Lancaster 1973).
In our model, it is precisely the fact that groups cannot ensure ex ante that
they will receive the beneﬁts of expropriation in the future that cause over-
expropriation in the ﬁrst period, making the level of bribes inefﬁciently large.
The degree of such inefﬁciency is related to how likely it is that the current
group in government retains power in the second period. That is, the degree
of such inefﬁciency is related to the political instability.
While countries that have higher political instability are predicted to ex-
hibit higher levels of indirect expropriation, direct expropriation levels are
lower. The intuition is as follows: because each group ﬁnds its chances of
being in power in the second period very unlikely, it becomes shortsighted
and demands a large quantity of bribes when in power (i.e., in the ﬁrst pe-
riod). This discourages investment, and the reduction of capital decreases the
marginal cost of direct expropriation, encouraging more expropriation in the
second period. The marginal beneﬁt is reduced as well because the tax base
shrinks, which reduces the incentives to expropriate. Under a Cobb-Douglas
technology assumption, the latter effect dominates and direct expropriation
goes down.
A second interesting result derived in this article is related to the concen-
tration of power. Following Tornell and Lane (1999), power is concentrated
when there are few groups competing for government. They ﬁnd that the
relation between indirect expropriation and the number of groups in power is
non-monotonic. Whenthereishighconcentrationofpowerinitially,adilution
of concentration results in more indirect expropriation, but this relationship
reverts when concentration is small (i.e., there is a large number of groups to
begin with). Direct expropriation, on the contrary, always increases with the
number of groups. We provide some details on the intuition behind this result
at the end of Section 4.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We deﬁne the different types
of expropriation in Section 1 and summarize the main empirical ﬁndings in
the literature in Section 2. We then proceed to describe some of the most
inﬂuential theoretical articles on expropriation in Section 3. In Section 4, our
model is described and the main results are derived. Section 5 concludes.290 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1. DEFINING EXPROPRIATION
Expropriation refers, in general, to policies that adversely affect the private
value of the stock and/or returns of foreign investment. As mentioned in the
previous section, we can distinguish between “direct” and “indirect” expro-
priation.
OECD (2004) provides an extensive analysis of the concept of expro-
priation, where jurisprudence, state practice, and literature on international
investment law are considered. According to the survey, direct expropriation
is “... an act where there is a compulsory transfer of property rights by the
hoststate....Anin vestmentisnationalisedorotherwisedirectlyexpropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright physical seizure. In addition to the
term expropriation, terms such as ‘dispossession,’ ‘taking,’ ‘deprivation,’or
privation’are also used.” Kobrin (1980, 1984) and Minor (1994) deﬁne direct
expropriationasthe“forceddivestmentofequityownershipofaforeigndirect
investor.” The principal characteristic is that such divestment is involuntary,
against the will of the owners and/or managers of the enterprise, and must
entail managerial control through equity ownership across national borders.
Indirectexpropriationstandsforotherformsofchangeintheinstitutional
environment that reduce the value of an investment, but in which property
is not necessarily seized. Schlemmer-Schulte (1999) characterizes indirect
expropriation “... as excessive and repetitive tax or regulatory measures that
have a de facto conﬁscatory effect in that their combined results deprive the
investorinfactofhisownership,controlorinterestsintheinvestment...” This
maybeaccomplished,inadditiontotheraisingoftaxes,throughmanipulation
of exchange rates (i.e., devaluations), fees or bribes charged to the enterprise,
the return of the ﬁrm to public ownership at unfair terms, the stiffening of
regulation, or the institution of non-tariff barriers, such as restrictions in the
repatriation of proﬁts or other capital transactions (referred to as “transfer
risk” by insurance companies). This form of indirect expropriation is also
referred to as “disguised” or “creeping expropriation.” In contrast to the case
of direct expropriation, there is no generally accepted deﬁnition of indirect
expropriation in international law. Moreover, the distinction between this
form of expropriation and non-compensable regulation (i.e., antitrust laws,
environmental protection, etc.) is not clear.2
2. LESSONS FROM THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Inthissection,wewillanalyzealternativeformsofexpropriationanddescribe
their changes over the past 30 years. Afterward, we summarize some of the
2 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004) for an extensive dis-
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empirical articles documenting the relationship between expropriation (and
other measures of the quality of institutions) and FDI.
Direct Expropriation
According to Minor (1994), there were 575 expropriation acts between 1960
and1992,committedby79developinghostcountriesagainstforeignmultina-
tionals. Africa was the region with the highest concentration of expropriation
events in the 1960s and 1970s, but Latin America and Asia became more
active during the 1980s. The manufacturing and petroleum sectors were the
most affected by direct expropriation: they account for about 40 percent of
all expropriation events between 1960 and 1964, and this percentage rises to
almost 50 percent in the period 1976–1979. Jensen (2005) points out that
another industry recently affected by major political events was privately ﬁ-
nanced infrastructure, in which some projects have been directly expropriated
(for example, the government of Thailand’s seizure of a private expressway
in 1993). Li (2004) documents that out of 520 expropriation acts committed
between 1960 and 1990, autocratic governments committed 423 acts while
democratic governments committed only 97 acts. This ﬁnding relates to the
fact that democratic governments have stronger institutions protecting prop-
erty rights.
Minor shows a decline in the number of expropriation events after the
1970s. This is explained by the fact that international conditions in the late
1970s increased the beneﬁts of FDI inﬂows and the freedom of action over
some multinational corporations was limited. For example, in 1990 a para-
graph in the Chinese-Foreign JointVenture Law added a “no nationalization”
clause (Robertson and Chen 1990). Tanzania adopted the National Invest-
ment Protection PolicyAct that offers legal protection against nationalization
(Corkran 1991). Of course, whether host countries respect such agreements
ex post is not obvious. A more important factor that reduced the incentives
to nationalize multinational corporations was the failure of state-owned en-
terprises. As mentioned earlier, more than 35 percent of the enterprises that
were expropriated prior to 1980 were subsequently privatized. This indicates
thatmultinationalcorporationshaveanadvantageoverdomesticgovernments
in running production (because investments are speciﬁc to the skills of their
foreign managers, for example), an assumption that will be made in the theo-
retical section of the article.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), “Disputes on direct expropriation—mainly related to nation-
alization that marked the 1970s and 1980s—have been replaced by disputes
related to foreign investment regulation and ‘indirect expropriation’” (OECD
2004, 2). The following section describes the particular form that this type of
expropriation has taken in recent years.292 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Indirect Expropriation
Indirect expropriation acts are more difﬁcult to document in a consistent man-
ner because of the lack of a formal or legal deﬁnition. In this subsection,
we will restrict attention to a set of examples to highlight the nature of these
expropriation acts.
Argentina’s ﬁnancial crisis of 2001–2002, when the “corralito” was im-
posed, provides a good example of indirect expropriation: the government
restricted capital transactions and “pesiﬁed” contracts and ﬁnancial assets.
Foreign ﬁrms’ funds were converted into pesos, and many contracts, espe-
cially in infrastructure, were rewritten or canceled. At the same time, capital
was not allowed to leave the country (hence the name, “corralito,” which
means “little fence”).
Janeba (2002) provides some other examples of indirect expropriation. In
1995, China announced the dissolution of various beneﬁts that foreign ﬁrms
receivedintheformofexemptionsfromcustomdutiesortaxrebateswhenus-
ing local materials. Russia frequently considered introducing a “super proﬁts
tax” for foreign oil companies investing in Russia. Government renegotiation
ofpower,electricity,andwatercontractsafterﬁnancialcrisesinArgentina,In-
donesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines constitute further examples (see Moran
2003). More recent examples include foreign oil companies being forced out
of their joint venture contracts, for example, such as the company, TNK-BP
in Russia.
ShleiferandVishny(1993)arguethatindirectexpropriationisparticularly
distortive for countries with unstable governments in which an entrepreneur
mayhavetobribeseveralpublicofﬁcialsandstillfacethepossibilitythatnone
of them really has the power to allow the project to proceed.
Stylized Facts
Trends
Researchers at the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) found that U.S. investors in emerging markets were subject to both
direct and indirect acts of expropriations between 1970 and 2001. The re-
searchers note that between 1971 and 1980, U.S. investors were exposed to
restrictions on transferring and repatriating funds (transfer risk) and also sub-
jecttoanumberofdirectexpropriations. Duringtheperiodof1981–1990, an
even greater increase in the number of transfer risks claims as well as major
reductions in the number of expropriations occurred. Chifor (2002) notes, “In
the past two decades, indirect expropriation has supplanted direct takings as
the dominant form of state interference with foreign investment, as host coun-
tries have learned that more value can be extracted from foreign enterprises
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seizures.” The period of 1996–2000 was risky for multinational corporations,
mainly because political violence and civil war claims increased dramatically.
For most ﬁrms, however, direct expropriation was the most damaging. As
Jensen (2005) notes, “Of all the dollars paid out by OPIC from 1970-1978,
96% of these claims were for expropriation. From 1991-2004, even after the
major ﬁnancial crises that triggered a number of transfer claims, 84% of the
settlement amounts of OPIC claims were for expropriation.”3
FDI, Expropriation, and Institutions
There are a large number of empirical articles that attempt to assess the quan-
titative importance of expropriations and the quality of institutions on FDI
inﬂows. Most studies make no distinction between the effects of direct and
indirect forms of expropriation. An exception to this are articles focusing on
corruption, a form of creeping expropriation. Mauro (1995) ﬁnds that cor-
ruption has a negative effect on total and private investment, thus hindering
growth. Wei (2000), using data on OECD countries, shows that corruption
indices are strongly and negatively correlated with FDI inﬂows. For exam-
ple, he estimates that an increase in Singapore’s level of corruption to that of
Mexico’s would have the same negative effect on inward FDI as raising the
tax rate on multinational corporations by 50 percentage points. Hines (1995)
documents a reduction in U.S. FDI in the period following the 1977 U.S. For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, which stipulated penalties for U.S. multinational
ﬁrms found to be bribing foreign ofﬁcials. Asiedu (2006), using a panel data
for 22 countries over the period 1984–2000, shows that a decline in Nigeria’s
level of corruption to that of South Africa’s has the same positive effect on
FDI as increasing the share of fuels and minerals in total exports by about 35
percent. He concludes that countries that are small or lack natural resources
can attract FDI by improving their institutions and policy environment.
Variables contained in the Political Risk Services/International Country
Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG) political risk dataset, such as corruption in govern-
ment, expropriation risk, bureaucratic quality, risk of repudiation of contracts
by the government, and law and order, are used in other studies to explain
differences in FDI inﬂows across countries. These variables are collected
in order to provide a comparable measure across countries of how expected
returns to capital investment are reduced by direct and indirect forms of ex-
propriation. While some components such as expropriation risk, for example,
only incorporate the probability that capital is expropriated after investment,
others such as corruption in government, for example, refer to reductions in
proﬁtability that will occur almost with certainty (i.e., bribes).
3 The United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides investment in-
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Daude and Stein (2001), using a simple average of the variables in the
PRS/ICRG dataset mentioned previously (for the year 1995), ﬁnd that a one
standard deviation improvement in the quality of institutions increases FDI
by a factor of 2.2. When focusing on risk of repudiation of contracts by the
government, an improvement of one standard deviation—for example, from
the level of Egypt to that of Finland—increases FDI by a factor of 1.4. They
alsoﬁndthatvariablesmeasuringeconomicpolicypredictabilityarepositively
correlated with FDI inﬂows. Busse and Hefeker (forthcoming), using the
same dataset for the period 1984–2005, ﬁnd that the quality of institutions is
a relevant factor for determining FDI inﬂows. The degree of ethnic tensions,
law and order, and government stability are all statistically signiﬁcant factors
affecting net FDI inﬂows.
HausmannandFern´ andez-Arias(2000)analyzetheeffectsofinstitutional
variables in the composition of capital inﬂows using variables compiled by
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat´ on (1999). They ﬁnd that lack of regula-
tory quality, government effectiveness and shareholder rights are signiﬁcant
factorsexplainingreductionsintheshareofinﬂowsrepresentedbyFDI.Using
the Institutional Investor Index as a measure of country risk, Raff and Srini-
vasan (1998) ﬁnd that in the manufacturing sector there is a -0.55 correlation
between country risk and inward FDI. Li and Resnick (2003) ﬁnd that both
property rights protection and democracy-related property rights protection
encourage FDI inﬂows.
In summary, there is concrete evidence from the empirical literature that
(1) poor quality of institutions, (2) alternative forms of expropriation, and (3)
lack of commitment of policy all have negative effects on FDI inﬂows. In the
nextsection,wewilldescribehowthetheoreticalliteratureattemptstoexplain
these correlations.
3. LESSONS FROM THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Mostofthetheoreticalliteratureassumesthatlocalgovernments’incentivesto
expropriatedependonthedifferencebetweenthebeneﬁtsofobtainingincome
from foreign capital (or the ownership of capital) and the opportunity costs of
expropriation. Afﬁliate operation is frequently less successful when managed
by the host government rather than by the MNC. This applies speciﬁcally
to projects in which the hosts import not only physical capital but also for-
eign entrepreneurship, either in the form of managerial skills or technological
know-how.
Under these assumptions, Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) present one of the
most inﬂuential articles on expropriation theory. They analyze a static econ-
omy where competitive investors decide on the amount of foreign investment
to be placed in a small open economy. The host country decides whether to
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income. The cost of such policy is given by the loss in productivity suffered
becausemanagerialservicesarenolongeravailableafterexpropriationoccurs.
Foreseeing that their capital might be expropriated ex post, foreign investors
will never increase their investment to the level where expropriation becomes
optimal. As a result, even though no expropriation occurs in equilibrium, the
international allocation of capital is distorted, and FDI remains inefﬁciently
low. Consequently, the ability of the government to expropriate when it lacks
the commitment to make binding promises on policy may actually reduce the
government’s welfare. Empirically, this explains why domestic factor prices
may not reﬂect social returns when the supply of investment is affected by the
threat of expropriation. This also supports the ﬁnding that commodity trade
fails to equate the returns to capital across countries.
Thomas and Worrall (1994) extend this idea to an inﬁnite-horizon econ-
omy and characterize the set of self-enforcing agreements between the host
government and an MNC (i.e., in a bilateral monopoly environment). The
contract speciﬁes the level of investment the MNC should make each period
and the amount of output that must be transferred to the host country. The
key is that the host government may have a short-term gain by reneging on
the contract and expropriating output or capital at any point. In this case, the
MNC retaliates by not investing in the future which entails a long-run cost
because the domestic economy returns to “autarky.” The sustainable contract
prescribes that investments should be inefﬁciently low in the initial periods
with no transfers to the host country. Investment rises afterward to a sta-
tionary level, in which the host country starts receiving transfers. Investment
is pro-cyclical, and transfers are positively serially correlated. Because the
temptation to expropriate is larger when output is high, the optimal contract
offers more transfers in the future. The back-loading result can be interpreted
as a tax holiday, in which the host country exempts investors from tax obliga-
tions. It provides some direct transfers and allows for duty-free imports.
Thomas and Worrall’s article is closely related to Doyle and van Wijn-
bergen (1994) who ﬁnd tax holidays as the outcome of a bargaining game
between a foreign investor and a small country, but in which the host country
can commit to tax rates for one period. Schnitzer (1999) obtains a similar
result by assuming that the foreign investor can switch to production facilities
in other countries, rather than assuming commitment to taxes. In contrast to
the previous articles, the self-enforcing contract may exhibit overinvestment.
While the previous studies were mostly concerned with explaining the
level of expropriation, Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2006) focus on its
cyclical properties. The role of the government is to insure the wages of do-
mestic workers, who do not have access to ﬁnancial markets and are subject
to output risk. The government can obtain resources from taxing the MNC’s
proﬁts (which the authors interpret as an indirect form of expropriation) and
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combination of lack of commitment and incomplete markets results in pol-
icy that generates ampliﬁcation and prolongation of shocks to output. The
government’s credibility not to expropriate is scarcest when the economy is
in a recession, which depresses investment and prolongs downturns. If the
governmenthadtheabilitytocommittoapolicysequence, itwouldusecoun-
tercyclical and undistortionary taxes. When it lacks commitment, it distorts
foreign investment in bad times and cannot achieve full insurance.
Thearticlesmentionedpreviouslyhaveacommoncharacteristic: govern-
ments are benevolent. Policymakers want to maximize welfare (or national
output), but they cannot achieve the ﬁrst best because they are tempted to
expropriate too much ex post. The lack of commitment to policy is the main
friction in these studies. One aspect that they do not address is that such
policies cause redistribution within agents in the host country. Interaction be-
tween powerful groups that compete to gain control and appropriate national
resources can lead to another source of inefﬁciencies that distort investment
decisions. The political economy game in which a “tragedy of commons”
arises, resulting in suboptimal investment levels, is studied in a series of arti-
cles by Tornell and co-authors. Tornell andVelasco (1992) explain why, even
though poor countries have a higher marginal productivity of capital, they are
subject to capital ﬂights toward richer countries. Their main idea is that in
countries with weak institutions and poor protection of property rights, some
groups can appropriate the returns of other groups by controlling ﬁscal pol-
icy. By investing some of their assets in foreign markets, domestic agents can
ensure private access and avoid “overappropriation” (i.e., indirect expropria-
tion) from other groups. Tornell and Lane (1999) use a similar environment
to explain how this dynamic interaction between groups leads to a slowdown
in economic growth. They show that dilution in the concentration of power
amelioratesthisproblem, aresultincontrasttothetraditionalwisdominmod-
els with a common pool problem. The explanation is based on the fact that
groups do not cooperate. So as the number of groups increases, each group
must reduce its appropriation rate to make sure its rate of return is no lower
than that of its outside option (i.e., investing in the more inefﬁcient informal
sector). These articles are closer to ours, due to their emphasis on political
factors such as disagreement over redistributive policy across the population
of the host country.
Our article is also closely related to Amador (2003), who ﬁnds that gov-
ernment borrowing is inefﬁciently high if there is some probability of losing
power in the future. It is also related to Azzimonti (2005), who provides
microfoundations in a probabilistic voting model for the shortsightedness of
parties in an environment in which the government chooses public investment
and the provision of a consumable public good. The underlying force driving
the inefﬁciency of policy is common to all three articles; the difference being
that in Azzimonti’s environment, investment is chosen by the party in powerM. Azzimonti and P. D. Sarte: Barriers to FDI 297
andtaxesareimposedonthedomesticgroup. Inthecurrentarticle,investment
is made by foreign investors who have an outside option and the proceeds of
expropriating part of it are distributed to a speciﬁc group. The article is also
related to a body of literature characterizing equilibria that rules out reputa-
tion. See, forexample,Azzimonti, Sarte, andSoares(2006); Quadrini(2005);
or Klein, Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2004), which characterize Markov-perfect
equilibria (the analogous to our equilibrium concept in an inﬁnite-horizon
economy). Finally, it is related to a set of political economy models in which
redistributive uncertainty results in inefﬁciencies (see Lizzeri 1999, Alesina
and Tabellini 1990, or Battaglini and Coate forthcoming).
4. THE EXPROPRIATION GAME
In this section, we describe the environment and derive our main results. We
proceed by specifying the timing and then solving for the subgame-perfect
equilibrium through backward induction.
The Environment
Theeconomyispopulatedbyagovernment,domesticagents,andforeigncap-
italists. Agents live for two periods. They are endowed with both one unit of
timeeachperiodandeunitsoftheonlyconsumptiongoodintheeconomy. We
can interpret e as an agent’s share of local production (which is not explicitly
modeled). Additional output can be produced by identical ﬁrms interacting in
competitivemarkets. Sharesoftheseﬁrmsareownedbyforeigninvestorswho
supplycapital(denotedbyK)butnotlabor. Theopportunitycostofinstalling
capital is given by the world interest rate r∗ that could be obtained by invest-
ing the funds in riskless bonds in international ﬁnancial markets. Following
Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), we will assume that “managerial services” are
the intangible assets that foreign investors bring to the production process:
organizational skills, technological knowledge, access to overseas markets,
etc. The main difference between managerial skills and physical capital is
that the former cannot be expropriated by the government. More importantly,
ifexpropriationoccurs, themanagerialservicesoftheforeigncapitalistareno
longer available for production. This implies that any capital expropriated by
the government becomes unproductive, because either the domestic worker
does not have the necessary skills to run production by himself or because the
capital installed by the foreign investor was speciﬁc to the manager’s skills.
Therefore, it cannot be used to produce using the foreign technology.
Production requires two inputs, domestic labor L and capital K and uses
the following technology:
Assumption 1 The production function satisﬁes
f(K,L)= AKαL1−α.298 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Domesticagents(theworkers)supplylaborinelasticallyatthecompetitive
wage rate w, and have no international mobility. Each belongs to one of n
groups (we can also interpret a group as a collection of individuals residing
in one of n districts), with total population normalized to one. Agents are
identical, so for symmetry we will assume that there is a measure 1
n of agents
per group or district. Their preferences over consumption satisfy standard
assumptions, as shown below.
Assumption 2 Instantaneous utility is logarithmic and additively separable,
and agents discount the future at rate β ∈ (0,1). Thus,
u(c1,c 2) = log(c1) + β log(c2).




Notice that while the former takes place after investment decisions have been
made, the latter takes place beforehand. This asymmetry will have important
implications regarding the effects of electoral uncertainty on expropriation
rates.
We will model both forms of expropriation as proportional rates. The
government will demand a proportion τ out of total investment to be paid by
any ﬁrm that intends to produce in the country. Notice that we refer to it as a
bribe, but in terms of the modeling technique, it is observationally equivalent
toaninvestmenttax. Therateatwhichinstalledcapitalisexpropriatedexpost
will be denoted by θ. Notice that activities are homogeneous in this model,
so the host country expropriates all activities at the same rate.4
The resources collected by either form of expropriation are used to pro-
vide lump sum transfers that can be targeted toward different groups in the
population. We will denote the transfer that group i receives, as a function of
the expropriation rate, by T i(θ).
Assumption 3 A group’s objective, when in power, is to maximize the utility
of its members.
The government expropriates FDI and distributes the proceeds between
agents residing in different districts in the country. Two remarks are relevant
at this point.
First, even though the expropriation rate by acting as an investment tax
distorts the optimal allocation of capital, it serves as an instrument to transfer
resources from foreign investors to local workers. The government, who only
4 We are abstracting from the fact that some sectors are more vulnerable to expropriation
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cares about the well-being of domestic agents, might be willing to compro-
mise future production (that will be reduced because inﬂows of K decrease)
in order to collect part of the dividends that would otherwise go to the hands
of foreigners. This tradeoff will determine the optimal level of creeping ex-
propriation chosen over time. Notice that the dynamic nature of the game
implies that, in general, it would not be optimal for the government to require
bribes at a level where investment in the country drops to zero (that is, a τ that
drives I = 0). Given the assumptions on technology, it would also never be
optimal to expropriate capital completely ex post. An important assumption
behind this result is the fact that domestic agents cannot produce with the
transnational corporation’s technology, as described previously.
This environment is a stylized version of an economy where output can
be produced with a domestic technology and a (possibly superior) foreign
technology. Becausewewanttofocusontheproblemofexpropriation, rather
than on the dynamics of the labor market, we assume that agents are simply
endowed with e units of the good and supply labor, inelastically, to foreign
ﬁrms. It would be interesting to analyze, as an extension, the case in which
labordecisionsareendogenousanddomesticﬁrmscompetewithtransnational
corporations for domestic labor. Reallocation of workers from one sector to
another after expropriation will cause some distortions—and probably beneﬁt
some types of workers while hurting others—that are ignored in the following
analysis.
Secondly, since transfers can be targeted toward speciﬁc districts, it is
reasonable to expect each region to lobby in order to obtain them. The dis-
agreement over how the budget should be allocated across districts can be
resolved by some form of voting. One way to model this would be by assum-
ing that there are n parties, each one representing a district that alternates in
power according to a Markov process. Amador (2003) presents a model with
symmetric parties that want to maximize the group’s consumption and face
some probability of being in power at each point in time (election dates are
uncertain). Once in power, the elected party chooses policy so as to maximize
the utility of its constituency. Azzimonti (2005) provides microfoundations
for the probabilities in a model of endogenous voting (but in which elections
occur at regular intervals). An alternative approach, presented in Battaglini
and Coate (forthcoming), assumes that legislators representing a district bar-
gain in congress over redistribution of the budget. These approaches share the
property that redistributive uncertainty—captured by the probability of being
the decisionmaker in the following period—plays a key role in the level of
distortions imposed by policy because of the shortsightedness it introduces.




of bribes they will demand from foreign investors, τ.
2. Investment Stage: foreign ﬁrms decide how much to invest, I,i n
the host country. Bribes are collected, targeted transfers T i
1 are
made, and consumption c1 takes place.
• Period 2:
1. ExpropriationStage: oneofthegroupsgainscontrolofthegovern-
ment and expropriates a proportion θ of already installed capital.
2. Post-Expropriation Stage: the good is produced, wages are paid,
targeted transfers T i
2 are made, and consumption c2 takes place.
Notice that we are assuming that there is no transnational corporation in
Period 1, so consumption at that point will be the sum of the endowment an
agentpossessesandthetransfersitobtainsfromthegovernment(thatcollected
resources in the form of creeping expropriation). We made this assumption
to simplify the exposition, but the model can easily be extended to a case in
which the government can also expropriate capital installed in the ﬁrst period
of a ﬁrm that invested in the country at some point in the past.
We will solve the problem by backward induction, starting from the last
stage in Period 2.
The Second Period
Post-Expropriation Stage
This subsection describes the optimization problem faced by the manager of a
representative ﬁrm. Considering a particular speciﬁcation for technology and
preferences,itcharacterizesacompetitiveequilibriumgiventheexpropriation
rate and transfers for this economy.
At this stage, the government has already expropriated θKout of the total
capital stock, hence the ﬁrm produces with the remaining amount of capital
(1−θ)K ≡ ˜ K.Firmstakeprices(thewagerateforlocalworkersw)asgi v en,
and demand labor in the local market to maximize proﬁts
maxf(˜ K,L)+ (1 − δ) ˜ K − wL,
where δ denotes the depreciation rate of capital.M. Azzimonti and P. D. Sarte: Barriers to FDI 301
The FOC is
fL( ˜ K,L)= w,
so labor is paid its marginal productivity. For our given production function,
this is equivalent to
(1 − α)A ˜ KαL−α = w.
Notice that since ˜ K ≤ K,the wage rate goes down after an expropriation.
This occurs because with a lower level of capital installed, workers are less
productive (this would hold for any arbitrary function that satisﬁes fLK > 0).
Recall that agents do not have access to capital markets, so their only
income is wage income wl, where l = 1 is the individual labor supply, plus
any transfers T i
2 received from the government. Their budget constraint can
be written as
ci
2 = e + w + T i
2.
Proposition 1 A competitive equilibrium given policy {θ,{T i
2(θ)}n
i=1},i sa
set of prices {w} and allocations {L,{ci
2}n
i=1} such that
1. consumption of agent i satisﬁes
ci
2 = e + w + T i
2(θ),
2. labor supply is L = 1,
3. wages are competitive
w = (1 − α)AHη ˜ KαL−α,a n d (1)








This is the stage in which after a group gains power, it chooses the proportion
θ of total capital to be expropriated.5 A group’s objective is to maximize the
utility of its supporters. This implies that, while they do not put any weight on
thewelfareofotherregionsorgroups,policymakersare“benevolentplanners”
for their own region.6
5 Because groups are homogeneous, we can focus on the problem of a representative one.
6 In the political economy literature, these policymakers are referred to as partisan. An al-
ternative approach, also studied in the literature, assumes that the leaders’ sole objective is to
maximize their probability of controlling the government because they either obtain some ego-
rents from being in power or they can redistribute resources to themselves (kleptocrats).302 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
It is assumed that there is no commitment technology: once in power, the
group will choose what is best for its constituency from that point on, taking
thecapitalstockasgiven. Thisimpliesthatpromisesmadebeforethepolitical
uncertainty is resolved are not credible. In particular, groups cannot credibly
promise to transfer resources to other regions in the future. As a result, it is in
no group’s interest to provide transfers to regions different than its own once
it is in power. Mathematically, this implies that group i will optimally set
T
j
2 = 0forj  = i.
This is the case because (1) groups do not derive utility from the well-
being of other regions, and (2) because they cannot sign binding contracts
with other groups over policy.







The maximization problem of the group in power at this point (where we




c2 = e + w + T2,
T2 = nθK, and
θ ≤ 1,
where w satisﬁes equation (1). Replacing the constraints above, we can sim-
plifytheobjectivefunctiontou(e+w+nθK). Thisimpliesthatatthesecond
stage the government maximizes utility by maximizing per capita consump-
tion of the group it represents, so the problem becomes simply
max
θ≤1
{e + w + nθK}.






≤ 0 (= 0i fθ<1).
The marginal beneﬁt of increasing the expropriation rate is given by the
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Expropriated rate in the x-axis




Notice that the marginal beneﬁt is independent of the level of θ. Graphically,
it can be represented by a horizontal line (see Figure 1).
The marginal cost is given by a decrease in the agent’s labor income due










= (1 − α)αA(1 − θ)α−1 Kα.
This function is increasing and convex in the rate of expropriation as long
as α<1, as typically assumed with a Cobb-Douglas production technology.
Moreover,becausetheMCbecomesinﬁnitelylargeasθ → 1,theintersection
between the two curves will occur at an interior point (again, refer to Figure
1).
Theoptimallevelofexpropriationisfoundbyequatingthemarginalcosts
and beneﬁts of increasing θ.
(1 − α)αA(1 − θ)α−1 Kα = nK.304 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Proposition 2 The optimal expropriation rate is given by










Thus, it is not optimal for any group in power to fully expropriate foreign
investment. That is, θE < 1.
Since all other groups are identical, the amount of expropriation in this
economy is independent of the identity of the group in power. An interesting
extension would be to analyze the case in which sectors were heterogeneous,
eitherintheircapitalintensityorintheabilityofthegovernmenttoexpropriate
them. In this case, workers would also be heterogeneous and disagree on the
rate of expropriation (and not only on where to target the transfers).
The First Period
Recallthattherearetworelevantstagesinthisperiod: investmentandcreeping
expropriation stages. We discuss them in the following section.
Investment Stage
We now move to the decision problem of a foreign ﬁrm considering whether
the project is worth pursuing in the host country. Expropriation affects this
decision on two margins. On the one hand, the cost of investment is increased
by the proportion of bribes that will need to be paid to the group in power. On
the other hand, the future returns of such investment will be reduced by the
fact that some proportion of capital will be expropriated in the second period.
Firms discount the future at the rate 1
1+r∗,a sr∗ represents their outside
option. The maximization problem faced by an investor at this stage is
max
I
− I(1 + τ)+
1
1 + r∗π(I)s.t.,
π(I) = f(˜ I,L)+ (1 − δ)˜ I − wL, and
˜ I = (1 − θ)I.
The cost of the investment is incurred today, while the beneﬁts π(I)are
received next period, which is why they are discounted. The investor knows
that for each unit of investment, he will need to pay a proportion τ today in
bribes or permits. He also knows that for each unit of capital installed, only a
fraction(1−θ)willbeproductive: therestisexpropriatedbythehostcountry.
The assumption of atomistic competitive investors implies that the action
of one of them does not affect the level of expropriation. In other words, each
takes θ and τ as given (for the case where the transnational corporation has
monopoly, and hence bargaining power, see Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1984M. Azzimonti and P. D. Sarte: Barriers to FDI 305
or Thomas and Worrall 1994). The ﬁrst-order condition for an investor is






∂I       
MB
= 0.
Therefore, the transnational corporation equates the marginal cost of in-
vestment to the discounted value of the marginal beneﬁt received from its
investment opportunity. A marginal increase in installed capital causes an
increase in beneﬁts of
∂π(I)
∂I
= (1 − θ)
 




increase in undepreciated capital, all multiplied by the proportion (1−θ)that
can be utilized. We can interpret θ
 
fI( ˜ I,L)+ (1 − δ)
 
as the opportunity
cost of expropriation: it represents the amount of potential beneﬁts that the
foreign investor could have obtained if it was not expropriated.
Notice that this value introduces a wedge-distorting investment decision:
it produces inefﬁciencies. This can be seen more clearly from the following
equation in which we have replaced the marginal beneﬁt and rearranged the
optimality condition:
fI( ˜ I,L)+ (1 − δ) =
 





Under our functional forms and noting that in equilibrium I = K, the
optimality condition becomes
α ((1 − θ)K)α−1 A + (1 − δ) =
(1 + r∗)(1 + τ)
(1 − θ)
.








If there was no expropriation, a foreign ﬁrm would invest KNE (where








As expected, expropriation discourages investment in the host country.





















At this stage, it is the group in power in Period 1 that decides the level of
bribes τ, which it will demand from potential investors. There are two main
differences between the tradeoffs faced by policymakers at this point, relative
to those faced in the second period, when choosing (ex post) direct expropri-
ation. First, because capital has not yet been installed, FDI is more “elastic.”
Given the outside opportunities faced by investors, this imposes a constraint
on the level of bribes, which in principle, should decrease the temptation to
extract too many resources from multinational corporations. Because of this,
we would expect creeping expropriation to be less harmful than direct ex-
propriation. On the other hand, the group decides on the level of τ without
knowing whether it will be in power next period. This introduces uncertainty
over who will have control of the expropriation technology in the second pe-
riod. More importantly, it introduces uncertainty on the identity of the group
receiving the beneﬁts of such expropriation. With probability 1 − p, another
groupgainscontrolanddistributesresourcesonlytowarditsownregion. This
second difference with respect to direct expropriation, given by the existence
of redistributional uncertainty, induces greater expropriation in the present
through bribes by any group in power in Period 1. Therefore, it is not clear
which type of expropriation is more distortive at the end.
Beforesolvingfortheoptimallevelofτ,weneedtospecifytheprocessby
which groups gain control of the government. In this article, we will assume
that groups alternate in power according to a stochastic Markov process: the
probability of being the decisionmaker next period, given that the group in
power today is denoted by p. Notice that this reduced-form speciﬁcation
is silent on whether groups gain control via a democratic process in which
parties compete for elections, or the turnover follows from revolutions and
coups following a nondemocratic (and possibly violent) process.
Consider the problem faced by a representative group in power in Period
1. It needs to choose the creeping expropriation rate τ on FDI inﬂows, taking
as given the behavior of the domestic sector and foreign ﬁrms, as well as
competitive prices and aggregates. In particular, it needs to take into account
the effects of the bribes and other forms of creeping expropriation chosen
based on the following:
1. The consumption of its constituency when the group is in power, be-
cause it is maximizing its utility
c1 = e + T1,a n dM. Azzimonti and P. D. Sarte: Barriers to FDI 307
c2 = e + w + T2.
2. The consumption of its constituency when the group is out of power,
because there is a probability that next period a different group is in
power,
˜ c2 = e + w.
3. FDIinﬂows,I = KE (inequilibrium),becauseforeigninvestorsdecide





where φ(n) is deﬁned in equation (2).
4. Transfers to the region it represents, via the government budget con-
straint
T1 = τnKE and
T2 = θEnKE.
5. Second period’s expropriation rate θE,










6. Equilibrium prices, because they affect their constituency’s consump-
tion




u(c1) + β{pu(c2) + (1 − p)u(˜ c2)},
subject to the conditions listed above.














When the rate of creeping expropriation increases today, there is a direct
effect in agents’consumption—captured in the ﬁrst term of the expression—
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This reduces the amount of capital available for production next period (recall
that dI
dτ = dKE
dτ ), which modiﬁes tomorrow’s consumption because the next
policymaker will face a lower tax base, and thus be forced to reduce the level
of transfers T2. Moreover, from condition 5 this triggers a reduction in direct
















then from condition 6 so is w. Because second period wages are unaffected
by creeping expropriation, the level of consumption when a group is out of
power is independent of τ. In other words, d˜ c2
dτ = 0, so the last term in the
ﬁrst-order condition cancels out. The fact that c2 is independent of the level
ofbribesisaresultoftheparticularassumptiononpreferences, becauseunder
logarithmic utility income and substitution effects cancel out. This results in
optimal direct expropriation rates being inversely proportional to the stock
of capital, so (1 − θ)K is constant and independent of τ. Replacing u by a
logarithmic utility, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Under assumption 2, redistributional uncertainty introduces a
wedge in the efﬁcient growth rate of consumption since, in the political equi-
librium
c2 = βpc1.
Absent the redistributional uncertainty (i.e., where groups act in a coordi-
natedfashion)thegovernmentwouldchoosepolicysothatc2 = βc1. Because
p<1, the equation above shows that the ratio of consumption between the
two periods is suboptimally low. In other words, the political uncertainty
makes policymakers too impatient.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal rate of creeping ex-
propriation is given by
τ =
γ(n) − eβp






(1 + r∗)(1 − α)
α
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Expropriation and Political Instability
Politicalinstabilityreferstothefrequencybywhichgroupsalternateinpower.
Countries facing high turnover rates are those where p is relatively small.
Why is this the case? Because the probability that any given group remains
in control of the government in the second period is low.
In this section, we analyze the implications of political instability on the
level of expropriation predicted by the model and contrast it to what the em-
pirical literature has found.
Proposition 4 characterizes how each rate of expropriation changes
with p.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions 1 and 2, we can show that
1. creeping expropriation is larger in countries with greater political in-









We can understand the intuition behind the negative relationship between
the amount of bribes and permits demanded by foreign investors τ, and the
probability of keeping control of the government p, by looking at the expres-
sion in Lemma 2. When the group in power faces relatively low political
instability, the chances of being able to appropriate transfers next period are
large. In this case, policymakers want to increase relative consumption (i.e.,
the ratio c2
c1). The change in p is equivalent to an increase in the degree of
patience of the group in power. Consumption in the second period becomes
relatively cheaper, creating a substitution effect toward less consumption to-
day and more consumption tomorrow. Due to market incompleteness, the
only way to achieve this transfer of resources is via a reduction in the de-
gree of creeping expropriation today, by lowering T1 and, thus, c1. Because
transnational corporations bring human capital and technology, they are more
efﬁcient in production than the local country. It is then optimal for any group
to wait and expropriate after investments have been made when p increases,
because the proportion of investment that will not be expropriated ex post
will be productive: KE increases with lower τ rates. If the country had ac-
cess to borrowing and lending, this effect would be reduced, but nonetheless,
present. Therefore, we should expect that countries with low turnover impose310 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
relatively low barriers to FDI inﬂows—that is, require lower bribes and make
construction and production permits cheaper to foreign investors.
The effect of p on direct expropriation is more subtle and has to do with
inter-group manipulation. Because θ is chosen after the political uncertainty
has been resolved, it is, in principle, unaffected by p. There is no direct
effect of turnover on expropriation ex post. Indirectly, however, increases in
p reduce creeping expropriation in the ﬁrst period and attract more FDI. In
other words, KE increases. Because there is a larger tax base, the MB of
expropriating in Period 2 increases. The marginal cost also increases but in a
lowerproportion(thisisduetotheCobb-Douglastechnologyassumption). As
aresult,θ goesup. Anotherwaytounderstandtheintuitionbehindthissecond
result is to consider the costs and beneﬁts of the group deciding today. If p is
relativelylow,anothergroupwillgaincontrolinPeriod2withhighprobability.
If the current group happens to be out of power tomorrow (a likely event),
direct expropriation imposes large costs in terms of reduced production and
no beneﬁts, because no transfers are received. There are incentives, therefore,
to manipulate future decisions by affecting the stock of capital inherited by
tomorrow’s policymaker and make direct expropriation less attractive. From
the expression in condition 5, Section 4, this can be achieved by decreasing
KE. How can the group controlling the government in Period 1 reduce future
capital? This can be accomplished by making FDI less attractive—increasing
thebarrierstoitsentrance. Weshould, therefore, expectanegativecorrelation
between political instability and direct expropriation rates.
Noticethatthisanalysisispartialinthesensethatweareonlyconsidering
a once-and-for-all investment decision. There is no action that a government
in the second period can take to undo the manipulation of the ﬁrst period
policymaker. In an economy with a longer horizon, in which investment
decisions were made every period, the group in power in Period 2 could also
demandbribesandpermits, andthusbreakthelinkbetweenﬁrstperiodbribes
andtheallocationofforeigncapitalinthecountry. Thatpossibilitywouldgive
groups controlling the government in Period 2 an extra degree of freedom. It
would then be interesting to extend the analysis to a case with an inﬁnite-
horizon economy.
Expropriation and Concentration of Power
The previous section assumed that differences in political instability only cor-
respond to political factors and were independent of other fundamentals of
the economy. In a model where such probability was endogenized, we would
expectp toberelatedtothenumberofgroupsintheeconomy,n. Iftherewere
many groups ﬁghting for power, given the same aggregate size of the popu-
lation, the probability of keeping control of the government would probably
be low, and we already know the effects this reduction has on expropriation.
On the other hand, a larger value of n implies that if a given group happenedM. Azzimonti and P. D. Sarte: Barriers to FDI 311
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to gain control, then the beneﬁts of expropriation per member in the group
wouldincreasebecausepercapitatransferswouldbelarger. Thisimpliesthat,
in principle, the relation between concentration of power and expropriation
could be non-monotonic.
We have calculated how creeping expropriation changes as we reduce the
concentration of power for a numerical example (the parameter values were
not calibrated but rather chosen to illustrate our point). The probability of






group in power has greater chances to gain control next period than any other
group in the opposition. The political economy literature has documented the
existence of such an advantage in democratic elections. In more authoritarian
systems, we often see groups or families in control of the government for long
periods of time because they have access to military force and other means of
repression. Increases in ξ can be interpreted as changes in political instability
not related to the concentration of power, which were studied in the previous
section, whereas the effects of concentration can be analyzed separately by
looking at the effects of changes in n.312 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Inspection of Figure 2 tells us that when there is relatively large concen-
tration of power (i.e., n close to 2), increases in the number of groups result
in more expropriation of both types. This happens because larger values of
n reduce p and, from the intuition in the previous section, this encourages
creeping expropriation activities, that is, rises in τ. On the other hand, when
there is little concentration of power, increases in the number of groups in a
given economy result in lower levels of τ. While the probability of remain-
ing in power decreases with n, transfers per capita increase, but in a larger
proportion and, therefore, dominate. Even though each group is less likely to
stay in power, the beneﬁts of expropriating in Period 1 more than compensate
the costs driven by an increase in the risk of losing control of the government
in Period 2. This result is different from the one found in the previous sec-
tion, and it gives a direct testable implication of the model. If countries have
greater political instability because there is low incumbency advantage, more
creeping expropriation is to be expected. If, on the other hand, it is due to the




We reviewed the empirical evidence on the effects of expropriation on FDI
inﬂows, mainly focusing on developing countries. We then discussed theoret-
ical models explaining how the quality of institutions affects FDI and growth.
In particular, we described how the different frictions present in the political
process result in policies that discourage FDI inﬂows. Finally, we presented
a simple model that sheds some light on the effects of expropriation on FDI
under: (1) lack of commitment to policy from the government, (2) redistri-
butional uncertainty resulting from stochastic alternation of groups in power,
and (3) the interaction between alternative forms of expropriation. The main
contribution of this work is twofold: the analysis of a model in which both
direct and indirect forms of expropriation are present and the study of how
the two types of expropriation relate to political instability. We also discussed
the effects of the concentration of power on the incentives to use each type of
expropriation and their resulting effects on investment.
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